TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925

TOP SECRET
Per Authority
Commanding General
FEAF APO 925
Date Initials

AG 381 (5 oct 51) INT-AT

SUBJECT: Air Targets in China and Manchuria

5 OCT 1951
CFS
AG RECORD

TO : Commander-in-Chief
Far East
APO 500
ATTENTION: Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

Filed AG 381 (TS-F)

NOT IN TS FILE

1. Reference your letter, subject: Air Targets in China and Manchuria, dated 26 September 1951, File T/Intel/P&E, requesting a list of military targets in China and Manchuria, the following comments and recommendations are furnished.

2. The selection of targets for an air attack program should be based on an overall plan and concept of operations. The brief statement given in the request for a list of targets does not provide an adequate basis for preparing an air attack program. A concept of operations that envisages the use of atomic weapons, for instance, will provide initial interdiction of major proportions by the destruction of marshalling yards and associated facilities within target complexes. This would make it possible to reduce the interdiction target list and thereby reduce force requirements for the task. Therefore, the inclosed lists of targets are tentative and subject to revision as the plans are developed.

3. Recommended target system priorities are as follows:

a. Air facilities
b. Transportation targets
c. POL
d. Electric power
e. Industry

These priorities are general in nature. It may be desirable to effect early attack of targets in low priority target systems in order to increase the impact of the overall air effort but, in general, air attack would be concentrated on one or two systems at a time.

4. Air Facilities. An airfield attack program is based for the most part on disposition of enemy units. A list of airfield targets for early attack would most likely radically change as an air offensive

TOP SECRET
AG Reg No. 953-L-51
Copy# 2 of 4 Copies
Page# 1 of 2 Pages.

TOP SECRET

62

develops. For this reason this list must be considered as more subject to change than other target lists. For list of targets see Inclosure #1.

5. Interdiction. A selection of interdiction targets is based on the objectives of the overall plan. An interdiction plan to isolate Manchuria from China for instance would be entirely different from one designed to isolate Manchuria from the Soviet Union. Each might be a logical objective of the overall plan. The attached list of targets (see inclosure #2) has been selected to accomplish three objectives: to isolate Manchuria from the present battle area in Korea; to inhibit the flow of supplies to China from Siberia and to disrupt internal communications in Manchuria. No bridge targets have been selected in China proper.

6. Marshalling Yards. The attached list of marshalling yards (see inclosure #3) constitutes the most important yards in China and Manchuria from the standpoint of the part they play in the communications network.

7. Industry. In the initial phase of air operations over Manchuria and China, photo cover of all industrial concentrations and isolated targets will be flown and interpreted to give the complete status of each of the targets. This is necessary because the Russians stripped many of the industries built up in Manchuria by the Japanese. Many have not been rebuilt and some are only now coming into production. The attached list of industrial and supply targets (see inclosure #4) will be revised in accordance with the findings arrived at through photo interpretation.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

NFF

4 Incls:
1. Air Facilities
2. Interdiction
3. Marshalling Yards
4. Industry

AG RECORDS CONTROL
DATE
ACTION
INFO
By: Per:

62